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The Influence of the
Universal Declaration as Law
JOHN DUGARD*

INTRODUCTION
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as we—as opposed to
many politicians and students!—all know, was a non-binding
resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It has no
binding legal effect except insofar as it has become customary
international law or been translated into treaty form. Consequently,
in assessing its influence as ―law,‖ it is necessary to determine which
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have
become custom or treaty law.
I do not wish to embark on an examination of which provisions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) qualify as
customary rules. Clearly, some, such as the prohibitions on torture,
detention without trial, and discrimination, have become customary
rules. Clearly some, such as the right to leisure in Article 24, have
not. Instead I wish to focus on the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which were drafted, and have been
implemented, with a view to giving effect to the UDHR ―as law.‖
Today it is pointless to examine the UDHR as ―law‖ without an
examination of its legally binding offspring, the Covenants. They,
together with the UDHR and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,1 constitute the International Bill of
* Professor of Law, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria; Visiting Professor of
Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Rights.
I could embark on a study of the manner in which these Covenants
have been ratified and monitored by their respective monitoring
committees. But I shall not do so. Instead I shall argue that the
UDHR and the Covenants together constitute a body of human rights
law that gives substance to the rights enshrined in the human rights
provisions—Articles 55 and 56—of the United Nations Charter. As a
consequence, their substantive principles, as opposed to the
procedural rules for implementation in the Covenants, are binding on
all member states of the United Nations under the Charter itself.
It will be recalled that in the years following the adoption of the
UDHR it was argued that the UDHR gave legal substance to the
human rights provisions of the Charter. This argument was generally
rejected on the ground that it was not possible to amend the Charter
by resolution of the General Assembly. Also it was pointed out,
rightly, that the language of the UDHR was exhortatory and too
imprecise to impose legal obligations. The same cannot be said of
the Covenants. They were drafted as legal instruments and describe
with clarity and qualification the rights they seek to protect. On the
other hand, the Covenants do not purport to amend the Charter, nor
have they followed the required procedure for amendment to the
Charter.
Today there is no doubt that the human rights provisions of the
Charter are legally binding. The International Court of Justice
confirmed this in the Namibia Opinion of 1971.2 It is also clear that
the human rights provisions are too broadly drafted, too general in
their language to give a clear indication of the rights protected. This
means that U.N. bodies charged with the task of applying human
rights standards and human rights law must have regard to some
lodestars. The sweeping provisions of the UDHR are too vague and
imprecise for this purpose. But their offspring, the Covenants, are
not. Consequently, the political and judicial organs of the U.N., in
applying the human rights provisions of the Charter and in being
guided by human rights standards, must be guided by the substantive
provisions of the Covenants, the International Bill of Rights.
In my brief intervention I cannot provide a comprehensive over2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21) [hereinafter ―Namibia Opinion‖].
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view of how the political organs of the United Nations, particularly
the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Human Rights
Council (previously the Commission on Human Rights), as well as
the judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of
Justice, have applied human rights law. That they have all been
guided by human rights law on occasion is incontestable. The
General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions that seek to
advance civil and political, economic, social, and cultural rights. The
Security Council has likewise adopted resolutions that express
concern about human rights violations. Most of these resolutions
have been adopted under Chapter VI of the Charter but several have
been adopted under Chapter VII. Witness the resolution referring the
situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court and Resolution
418 of 1977 imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa
because of its policy of apartheid.3 The Commission on Human
Rights and now the Human Rights Council are committed to
promoting and defending human rights. And the International Court
of Justice, which is not a human rights court, has handed down many
decisions that assert the rights and obligations of States in respect of
human rights.4
All is not well, however, with the state of human rights in the
world today. And in part the political organs of the United Nations,
and its Secretariat, are to blame. Of course, the political organs are
only as committed to human rights as their member States allow.
Consequently, insofar as blame attaches, it is to the majorities in
these organs. In my intervention I will focus on three issues that
augur ill for human rights: first, the movement of the Security
Council away from the notion that the violation of human rights can
constitute a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the
Charter; second, the failure of the Security Council and Secretariat
(that is, the Secretary-General) to implement an Advisory Opinion of
the International Court of Justice on a particular human rights matter;
and third, the failure of the Human Rights Council to concern itself
sufficiently with human rights violations in the developing world.

3. In March 2005, France proposed a resolution to the U.N. Security Council that would
refer Darfur to the International Criminal Court. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593
(Mar. 31, 2005). U.N. Resolution 418 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against apartheid
South Africa. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
4. See SHIV R. S. BEDI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BY THE JUDGES OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2007).
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL PEACE, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
It seems trite, at least to the lay person, that a human rights
situation in a particular State can threaten international peace and
security. For years the Security Council resisted such a conclusion as
it sought to balance Chapter VII with Article 2(7) of the Charter. But
in 1977 the Security Council at last resolved that the excesses of
apartheid in South Africa—a purely internal situation—constituted a
threat to international peace under Chapter VII that warranted
measures under Article 41.5 Resolution 418 was couched in language
that suggested that some external element might possibly be
involved. Accordingly, paragraph one of the resolution reads that the
Security Council: ―Determines, having regard to the policies and acts
of the South Africa government, that the acquisition by South Africa
of arms and related materiel constitutes a threat to the maintenance of
international peace and security.‖6
There was also passing reference in the second preambular
paragraph of Resolution 418 to the fact that South Africa’s military
build-up and attacks on neighboring states disturbed international
peace.7 However, this was mere window dressing designed to
appease those who might still have had doubts as to whether an
internal situation might constitute a threat to international peace. The
Security Council debates make it clear that the real reason for the
resolution was the suppression of political opposition by the
apartheid regime in the wake of the killing of Steve Biko. That is, it
addressed a purely internal human rights violation.
Despite the victory for the proposition that an internal situation
might constitute a threat to international peace, there has been an
attempt to deny this proposition and to return to the primacy of
Article 2(7). Surprisingly, such an argument has been advanced by
5. S.C. Res. 418, supra note 3. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter states: ―The Security
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed
to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.‖
6. S.C. Res. 418, supra note 3, ¶ 1.
7. Id. pmbl. (―Recognizing that the military build-up by South Africa and its persistent
acts of aggression against the neighboring States seriously disturb the security of those
States.‖).
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the African National Congress government of South Africa, the same
political body that lobbied hard for the notion that an internal
situation—apartheid—constituted a threat to international peace and
security.
This argument forms the basis of South Africa’s protection of the
rule of Robert Mugabe from international scrutiny. However, it was
more publicly aired when, in 2007, South Africa cast its vote against
a draft resolution before the Security Council, under Chapter VI of
the Charter, that sought to condemn the violation of human rights by
the military regime of Myanmar/Burma. The resolution, introduced
by the United States and the United Kingdom, was killed by the
vetoes of China and the Russian Federation. But South Africa also
voted against the resolution on the ground that the draft resolution did
not ―fit with the Charter mandate conferred on the Security Council,
which is to deal with matters that are a threat to international peace
and security.‖8 That is, an internal human rights situation could not
constitute a threat to international peace and security.
This decision has been explained by Dire Tladi of the South
African Department of Foreign Affairs Legal Affairs—in an article
that does ―not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of
Foreign Affairs‖—as follows.9 A purely internal situation cannot
constitute a threat to international peace. There must, in addition, be
some armed conflict or potential for armed conflict between States.10
Apartheid, says Tladi, was condemned by the Security Council
because of the threat it posed to neighboring States and not because
of the internal situation in South Africa itself.11 However, as pointed
out above, the debates in the Security Council make it clear that
Resolution 418 was prompted by internal repression and not external
aggression.
South Africa, under President Mbeki, took upon itself to lead the
developing world by identifying the lowest common denominator of
opinion among such States and to exalt this opinion to a foreign
policy position. South Africa’s argument that the Security Council
8. U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5619th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5619 (Jan. 12, 2007)
(statement of Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa).
9. Dire Tladi, Strict Positivism, Moral Arguments, Human Rights and the Security
Council: South Africa and the Myanmar Vote, 8 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L. J. 23, 30 (2008).
10. Id. (citing ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 144 (2004)).
11. Id. at 34.
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should not, and cannot, concern itself with internal human rights
situations is, unfortunately, shared by many other States in the
developing world. In part, it reflects hostility to the skewed composition of the Security Council, and in part, hostility to human rights
and the idea that the violation of human rights is of concern to all
States. One hopes that the new government in South Africa will
abandon this policy and return to the more enlightened philosophy of
the Mandela era.
There have been important developments in international law since
the adoption of Resolution 418 in 1977. That certain norms are
peremptory and that certain obligations have an erga omnes reach is
now accepted. Moreover, the notion of an international duty to
protect in situations involving a serious violation of human rights is
accepted by the United Nations.12 These developments have all been
inspired by the International Bill of Rights. In these circumstances,
there can be no substance in the argument that an internal situation
cannot threaten international peace for the purpose of Security
Council action.
The Mbeki doctrine seriously undermines the international protection of human rights and must be repudiated.
THE REFUSAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ATTEMPT TO
IMPLEMENT THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE ON THE WALL
In 2004 the International Court of Justice found, in an advisory
opinion, that the wall Israel is constructing within Palestinian
territory violates norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) and
human rights law.13 It stated that the construction of the wall ―constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the
applicable IHL and human rights instruments.‖14 The human rights
instruments in question were the two Covenants and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child.15
12. See, for example, the General Assembly’s acceptance at the World Summit of the
High Level Panel’s recommendation in the Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2004).
13. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 193–94 (July 9).
14. Id.
15. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1577
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The Opinion is advisory and therefore not binding on States,
particularly those that have persistently objected to it (notably Israel
and the United States). Thus Israel may be faulted for failing to
desist from violating its obligations under IHL and human rights law
but not for failing to comply with the advisory opinion. The position
of the United Nations and its Secretary-General is less defensible.
The Opinion was requested and subsequently approved by the
General Assembly, adopted by 150 votes in favor (including the
European Union (EU) and Russian Federation), with six against and
ten abstentions.16 It is therefore the law of the United Nations17 and
as such must be implemented by the Secretary-General, who acts as
the executive officer of the United Nations. But, despite this, the
Secretary-General, both in his public statements (for instance at the
Annapolis meeting in 2007) and in words and deeds on behalf of the
Quartet (the U.N. body charged by the Security Council with
promoting peace in the region), refuses even to acknowledge the
Opinion. This is starkly illustrated by the most recent statement of
the Quartet on September 26, 2008,18 which, like its predecessors,
makes no mention whatsoever of the Advisory Opinion and the need
to persuade or compel Israel to comply with the Opinion—as the law
of the U.N.!
The failure of the U.N. in general, and its Secretary-General in
particular, to even attempt to implement the Advisory Opinion on the
wall compares unfavorably with the response of the U.N. to the 1971
Advisory Opinion on Namibia.19 This Opinion was treated by the
U.N. as the legal framework for Namibian independence. The
Secretary-General symbolizes the U.N. He is its leader. His
unwillingness to uphold an Opinion by the judicial arm of the U.N.
shows a lack of commitment to the Rule of Law in general and, in
this case, to human rights in particular.
THE FAILURE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
The Human Rights Council (HRC), like its predecessor, the
Commission on Human Rights, owes its existence to the International
U.N.T.S. 3.
16. G.A. Res. ES-10/15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004).
17. See Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa,
Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 23, 46–47 (June 1) (Lauterpacht, J., separate opinion).
18. Statement, The Quartet, No. S319/08 (Sept. 26, 2008).
19. Namibia Opinion, supra note 2.
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Bill of Rights. The HRC is designed to promote and protect the
rights enshrined in the UDHR. Whether it acts in an even-handed
manner to achieve this goal is, however, open to serious doubt. The
HRC consists of the representatives of States and is a political body.
Nevertheless the politicization of the HRC, and so of human rights,
has surpassed expectations. It is common knowledge that the HRC
has devoted too little attention to human rights violations in the
developing world—such as Zimbabwe, Darfur and Burma—and
devoted too much attention to Israel and Palestine. Critics of the
HRC from the West focus on this phenomenon without addressing
the cause. They fail to ask the question whether the West’s protection of Israel in the Security Council, the Quartet, and the EU may
explain the determination of the developing world to use the HRC as
an instrument for attacking Israel. They fail to ask whether the
West’s double standard on Israel may explain the double standard
applied by the developing world in respect of its members.
As Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, I have had a unique opportunity to
observe the behavior of States in the HRC. I have experienced the
frustration of the developing world over the failure of the West to
take Israel’s violations of IHL and human rights seriously. I have
heard delegates from the developing world ask how the West can
refuse to hold Israel to account for its violations of numerous U.N.
resolutions, ranging from the illegality of settlements to violations of
the most basic freedoms. How can the West, they ask, which claims
to respect the Rule of Law and human rights, completely ignore the
2004 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
wall? How can the West, which controls the Quartet, allow the
Quartet to completely ignore Israel’s violations of IHL and human
rights as a factor to be considered in the peace process?
At the same time, I have heard delegates from the West complain,
rightly, about the manner in which the developing States protect their
own members from scrutiny on human rights grounds and about the
manner in which the HRC fails to show sufficient concern about
issues such as Zimbabwe, Sudan’s Darfur, and Burma/Myanmar. I
do not have a solution to this problem. However, I do believe that if
the West were to take Israel’s violations of human rights more
seriously, both in word and deed, it might be easier for the West to
persuade the developing world to be less protective of its own
member States. The West must face the fact that the Palestinian issue
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is the litmus test for human rights as far as the developing world is
concerned. If the West fails to show concern for human rights in the
Palestinian Territory, the developing world will conclude that human
rights are a tool employed by the West against regimes it dislikes and
not a universal and objective instrument for the measurement of the
treatment of people throughout the world.
CONCLUSION
As a component of the International Bill of Rights, the UDHR is
―law.‖ In particular, it is the law of the U.N. As such, it should
guide State delegations in their decision-making in the U.N. As the
law of the U.N., it is legally binding on the Secretary-General. The
above three issues show that the International Bill of Rights ceases to
be the ―law‖ when there is no political will to enforce and implement
it. In some situations, politics prevails over the law. Of course, this
occurs in national societies too, but the international order, without
effective enforcement and compulsory adjudication, is more prone to
political ―override‖ and manipulation. The task facing the international human rights lawyer today is not to establish that the
International Bill of Rights is ―law‖—that is no longer seriously
questioned—but to ensure that it will be respected as law across the
board by political decision-makers.

